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ABSTRACT 
 
Are sources of economic rent, as defined by the prevalent business strategy paradigm, sufficient to attain and 
maintain superior returns? The perspective developed within the conceptual framework of the Institutional 
Theory may offer managers a contribution towards understanding the strategy process and its potentialities, 
particularly by stressing the leading role played by legitimacy, the influence of many institutional spheres, the 
isomorphic pressures, ceremonial behavior and decoupling, among other elements, that mainstream business 
strategy fails to address directly, but which may have a significant effect on firm performance. We advance that 
these elements must be accounted for in the pursuit and acquisition of economic rents, even if the ability to 
articulate them purposefully is constrained by rationality, agency conditions and the manager's social 
embeddedness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In traditional economics, as well as in a large portion of Business Strategy theory, the main purpose 
of a firm is to maximize profit. Managers are expected to conceive strategies leading to better 
positions - as compared to competitors - in attractive industries; to identify and utilize distinctive 
resources (or competences), through which they may achieve sustainable above-average returns.  
Generally speaking, the prevalent thinking in the field of Business Strategy lies in assumptions that 
may be questionable from the perspective of Organizations Theory in general and Institutional Theory 
in particular. Most Business Strategy studies emphasize achieving economic rents through the pursuit 
of efficiency, dealing with the constraints imposed by the technical environment. Such studies usually 
understand that agents have a broad ability to apprehend the social context in which they operate, and 
are endowed with high capacity to intervene in social reality and to control their interventions.  
This paper proposes that achieving and maintaining above-average returns depends not only on 
successfully obtaining sources of economic rent, but also on obtaining and retaining legitimacy, whose 
management must not be neglected. Legitimacy is a core topic in Institutional Theory and is frequently 
disregarded by dominant approaches in the Business Strategy field. The purpose of this paper is to 
show that a combined understanding of the technical and institutional facets of the environment and of 
organizations, as well as of the condition and possibilities of agency, is pertinent and relevant to those 
that would formulate and implement business strategies, thereby confirming the need for a strong 
theoretical connection between the fields of Organizations Theory and Strategy.  
Although several texts exist on strategic choice and institutional pressures, few articulate 
institutionalist arguments vis-à-vis the different theoretical schools of Business Strategy, particularly 
regarding strategy formulation and execution.  
 
 
THE FIELD OF BUSINESS STRATEGY     
 
 
Given the diverse theoretical schools of thought in Business Strategy, it is worth introducing them 
briefly, highlighting their characteristic assumptions and hypotheses.  
According to Vasconcelos and Cyrino (2000), the field of Business Strategy is based on the 
understanding (and pursuit) of a competitive advantage associated with market failures. The concept 
of strategy would be unnecessary, and even dysfunctional, if the market were perfectly competitive, as 
described in the conceptual framework of neo-classical economics. What good would strategy do if the 
decisions of firms were concentrated on the allocation of fungible resources across finite alternatives 
known to all, with given technology and know how, and with perfectly fluid diffusion processes? 
The influence of economics in the field of Business Strategy has been very significant (Besanko et 
al., 2000; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). Ghemawat (2002), for example, outlines the historical 
development of the field with an almost exclusively economic emphasis, without significant 
references to possible cultural and cognitive influences. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, deviations from the promises of the perfect competition 
model - or market failures - are explored by the school of thought that became known as Industrial 
Organization (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939) and, more recently, by Caves (1980) and Porter (1980, 1985). 
Exploration of these imperfections provides a basis for competitive advantage to be understood as 
obtaining monopoly rents in markets with little competition by favorable positioning in strategic 
groups (Caves & Porter, 1977). This school of thought is prevalent, in absolute terms, in the study of 
the main strategic management references quoted in the Strategic Management Journal - SMJ, but 
has been losing ground since the 1990s (Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004).  Economic Rents and Legitimacy: Incorporating Elements of Organizational Analysis Institutional Theory  
to the Field of Business Strategy  
 
BAR, v. 4, n. 1, art. 4, p. 51-65, Jan./April 2007    www.anpad.org.br/bar 
53
The concept that qualitative differences among firms can be charged to specific resources is a central 
break from theories focused on monopoly rents, which credit performance variations among firms to 
external factors such as industry structure. Since the 1980s, scholars associated with the Industrial 
Organization school and the proponents of the Resource Based View – RBV have been engaged in a 
heated debate. According to the RBV, as originally posited by Penrose (1959) and, subsequently, by 
Wernerfelt (1984), Peteraf (1993) and Barney (1986a, 1991), firms' sources of competitive advantage 
lie, primarily, in the resources and competences of individual firms, and only secondarily in the 
structure of the industries in which they operate.  
The view of competitive advantage as the result of market failures remains in the RBV, but it shifts 
from the products market to the factors market (Barney, 1986a, 1991) and is reflected in Ricardian 
rents. This school attained a central position in theoretical references of the SMJ since the second half 
of the 1990s (Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) laying the foundations for a possible new 
theory of the firm (Conner, 1991).  
The process of resource accumulation development in organizations is discussed by Dierickx and 
Cool (1989) and developed theoretically by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) from the perspective of 
dynamic capabilities. Based on the general concept of the firm as a set of resources, this model 
analyzes the relationships between decision processes, actions, and managerial consequences in terms 
of the formation, conservation and destruction of resources “in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-
based competition, price/performance rivalry, increasing returns and the creative destruction of 
existing competences” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997, p. 509; Schumpeter, 1934). This emphasizes the 
role strategic management plays in the adaptation and reconfiguration of organizational resources and 
skills to face the demands of a dynamic, mutable external environment. Therefore, unlike the OI and 
RBV views, the view of dynamic capabilities creates an important possibility of convergence between 
strategy and organizations theory (Vasconcelos & Cyrino, 2000) that supports the proposal we 
advocate here.  
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991) highlight Transaction Costs Economics (Coase, 1937; North, 
1993; Williamson, 1985) as a point of approximation for Business Strategy, Economics and 
Organizations Theory, when considering limited rationality (March, 1978; Simon, 1947), opportunistic 
behavior and the role of institutions to alleviate uncertainty (North, 1993). Transaction costs analysis 
is a cross-disciplinary approach that proposes to combine economics, organizations theory and 
contracts law, with emphasis on the translation of the implications of limited rationality and the role of 
institutions in terms of efficiency and cost. Still, economic thinking remains prevalent, as Granovetter 
(1985) points out in his critique of this view.  
On developing an overview of the field of Business Strategy, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 
(1998) makes reference to ten schools of strategic thinking. Some are characterized by their 
prescriptive orientation, that is, their concern with how strategies are to be formulated, and what 
their content should be (schools of design, planning and positioning). Others are descriptive, 
focusing on the strategy formulation process (the entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, 
cultural and environmental schools). He further points out the existence of a configuration school, 
which he supports, and is presented as an attempt to merge the others: it appreciates planning, but 
acknowledges its limitations; it takes place deliberately at times, or in an emerging way at others. It 
argues that as a strategy is implemented, a series of developments deviate from its originally 
intended path, creating room for the emergence of new patterns that may imply new strategies 
(emerging strategies). An emerging strategy is, in essence, an unplanned strategy, a line of action 
that the organization only perceives as strategic as it unfolds or even after the fact (Mintzberg, 
1978).  
Like Vasconcelos and Cyrino (2000), we can also see in Mintzberg the proposition of a 
convergence between the field of Business Strategy and Organizations Theory. This is even clearer 
in a previous work (Mintzberg, 1994), where he points out a series of strategic planning fallacies: 
the fallacy of prediction (predictability of the environment, action course and its consequences); the 
fallacy of detachment (the strategist remaining at arm's length and retaining an objective vision or Marco Aurélio Lima de Queiroz, Flávio Carvalho de Vasconcelos, Rafael Guilherme Burstein Goldszmidt 
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reality) and the fallacy of formalization (the possibility of formalizing the strategy and its 
implementation process).  
In an attempt to organize a discussion of the diversity of the field of Business Strategy, Whittington 
(1993) presents four generic perspectives of strategy: classical, evolutionary, processual and systemic, 
which differ in terms of results (what strategy is for – economic focus or diverse objectives) and 
processes (how it develops – deliberate or emerging). It is worth noting, in line with the purpose of 
this work, that the core message of the systemic perspective, according to Whittington, is that the 
strategy must be sociologically sensible.  
Whittington notes that these different perspectives, each with distinct implications for managerial 
action, are all capable of accumulating a significant body of evidence in their favor. Faced with such 
ambiguity, it befalls managers to choose the theoretical description of the activity and human 
environment that best fit their worldview, their personal theory of action (Argyris & Schon, 1978).  
The field of Business Strategy, as described, comprehends many theoretical schools; little consensus 
exists, which may help to account for the low levels of academic productivity seen in recent years 
(Boyd, Finkelstein, & Gove, 2005; Pfeffer, 1993). Despite the diversity, no works are to be found 
emphasizing aspects relative to the dynamics and relevance of institutions to the strategy formulation 
and execution process. Evidence of this statement can be found in the empirical study of Ramos-
Rodrigues and Ruiz-Navarro (2004), who failed to identify any references specifically associated with 
the Institutional Theory among the most frequent quotes published in the Strategic Management 
Journal - SMJ.  
 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE DISCUSSION OVER AGENCY AND STRUCTURE  
 
 
According to DiMaggio, “The distinguishing contribution of Institutional Theory rests in the 
identification of causal mechanisms leading to organizational change and stability on the basis of 
preconscious understandings that organizational actors share, independent of their interests” (1988, 
p. 3). 
Institutional Theory expands in the realm of organizations in the 1970s, as an extension of the 
previous decade's intellectual revolution, which introduced the concept of open systems into 
organizations studies (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967), pointing out the importance of context 
or environment inasmuch as “it constrains, shapes, penetrates and renews the organization. . . 
organizations were seen to be more than production systems; they were social and cultural systems” 
(Scott, 2001 p. xx). The influence of the concept of the social construction of reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, [1967] 1998), and of limited rationality (March, 1978; Simon, 1947) must also be 
highlighted.  
The early institutionalists distanced themselves from the neo-classical view, which prevails in the 
conception of organizations as closed systems, on four key points:  instead of perfect competition and 
unique equilibrium, they postulate market power and indetermination; economic agents' preferences 
are not regarded as individual decisions, but as a socially constructed process, shaped by social 
institutions; instead of utilitarian assumptions, regarded as naive, they propose a behavioral realism; 
and, finally, they replace universal generalizations with context (time and space) (Jacobby, 1990).  
Scott (2001) notes differences in the definition of an institution, due to different concepts of the 
nature of social reality and social order and the types and extent of the agents' rationality as they 
make choices. According to his definition, “institutions are social structures that have attained a high 
degree of resilience; institutions are composed of cultured-cognitive, normative and regulative 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life; institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, Economic Rents and Legitimacy: Incorporating Elements of Organizational Analysis Institutional Theory  
to the Field of Business Strategy  
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relational systems, routines and artifacts; institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction…(they) 
are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous” (2001, p. 48).  
It is important to note that, unlike the analytical strategies and the assumptions that prevailed in 
Organizations Theory at the time, the early institutional approaches emphasize factors that made it 
unlikely for agents to recognize their interests or act according to them. They also address the 
circumstances that constrain actors’ ability to recognize their interests and act accordingly, particularly 
“the limits on cognition and coordination, which make it difficult or impossible for actors to 
understand the relationship between means and ends” (DiMaggio, 1988, p.5). According to this view, 
structure prevails over (capacity for) agency.  
DiMaggio attempts to relocate interest and agency to a central position in Institutional Theory, 
suggesting that institutionalization be seen as “a product of the political efforts of actors to accomplish 
their ends and that the success of an institutionalization project and the form that the resulting 
institution takes depend on the relative power of the actors who support, oppose, or otherwise strive to 
influence it” (1988, p. 13). According to DiMaggio, the process follows “an internal logic of 
contradiction, such that the success of an institutionalization process creates new sets of legitimate 
actors who, in the course of pursuing distinct interests, tend to delegitimate and deinstitutionalize 
aspects of the institutional forms to which they owe their own autonomy and legitimacy” (p.13). 
The nature of the relationship between agency and structure is a core issue in the debate of the 
Institutional Theory and in the field of Business Strategy alike; its implications are clear to the 
discussion of the possibilities of strategy formulation and execution, which is the focus of this study.  
Giddens (1989) suggests that the relationship between agency and structure is of a recursive nature, 
arguing that structure is not a product of independent human activity by itself, an object outside the 
subject, but rather “a set of rules and resources that can only exist as a space-time presence, in its 
examples in social practices, and as mnemonic traits that guide agents' conduct” (p. 442). Structure is 
the medium and the result of the conduct it organizes recursively. The relationship between subject 
(agent) and object (structure) must be reconceptualized as one of duality, rather than dualism.  
In line with Giddens’ duality proposition, Sewell (1992) explores the possibilities for agency, 
identified as: the participation of social agents (agents) in several (institutional) spheres that are 
connected or compete for resources, the transposition of schemes from one sphere to another and the 
interpretation of social agents of the meaning of resources.   
Whittington (1992) offers an extensive analysis of published organizations studies texts that report 
on Giddens' proposition (Theory of Structuration). He understands that researchers tend to perceive 
institutionalization processes as promoting resolution and accommodation; he suggests taking up 
structurationism, that is, the acceptance of structural conflict and stress between agency and 
structure. He recommends a sociological realism that emphasizes both agency and structure, avoiding 
the determinism / voluntarism dichotomy that marks several theoretical schools (Whittington, 1988). 
According to him, agency possibilities relate to the internal ambiguity and plurality of the rules that 
govern the reproduction of a specific set of social structures, as well as to the contradictions brought 
about by rules and resources that agents import from other social systems in which they take part 
(their social identities). The reflexivity of agents eventually stands as a resource to try to deliberately 
change the system's reproduction.  
In another review of published works on strategic management using Structuration  Theory between 
1995 and 2000, Pozzebon (2004) concludes that Giddens' propositions were incorporated into other 
analytical perspectives, enhancing the roles of both agency and structure in the development of what 
the author calls integrating approaches.  
The view that the relationship between agency and structure is of a chiefly recursive nature and 
mediated by interpretation (Machado-da-Silva, Fonseca, & Crubellate, 2005) challenges the prevalent 
Business Strategy argument that strategy determines structure (Chandler, 1962). Simultaneous 
emphasis on agency and structure questions the validity of the assumptions of several of the field's Marco Aurélio Lima de Queiroz, Flávio Carvalho de Vasconcelos, Rafael Guilherme Burstein Goldszmidt 
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theoretical schools. Mintzberg suggests that “structure follows strategy. . . like the left foot follows the 
right” (1990, p. 183).    
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES AND SPACE FOR STRATEGIC RESPONSES  
 
 
Organizations endure pressures from the institutional environment that are characterized as 
isomorphic mechanisms: “. . . structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by 
competition or by the need for efficiency. Instead, we will contend, bureaucratization and other forms 
of organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without 
necessarily making them more efficient” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). Such pressures are 
intrinsically associated with institutionalization processes: “highly structured organizational fields 
provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often 
lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture and output” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 
147).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) point out that “institutional rules function as myths which organizations 
incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects” (p. 340). Any 
conflicts between the pursuit of technical efficiency and the maintenance of institutional rules 
(legitimacy) can be resolved by adopting ceremonial behavior, by decoupling (loosening) internal 
control, based on a trust and good-faith reasoning. That is, once it is believed that the agents involved 
are committed to the organization's success (or survival), there can be tolerance and compromises so 
that conflict does not become too severe, capable – paradoxically at first sight – of jeopardizing the 
organization's long-term effectiveness.  
If, on the one hand, isomorphic pressures appear to enhance the role of structure, constraining the 
agent, on the other hand, ceremonial behavior reveals possibilities of choice. Oliver (1991) discusses 
how responses to institutional pressure may vary from passive conformity to active resistance, 
depending on the nature and context of the pressures. She identifies as possible strategic responses: 
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. Developing this view, Scott (2001) 
notes that responses may be collective, rather than only individual.  
Another strategic response possibility is inherent to the agent's action, inasmuch as such action 
always contributes to the institutionalization (and de-institutionalization) of social structures, taking 
the structurationist view discussed earlier.  
In this sense, Oliver (1992) points out the conditions that may encourage and/or contribute to 
institutional change processes: functional (performance issues), political (changes in interests or in the 
power distribution that upheld institutional arrangements) and social (groups differentiation, 
heterogeneous or diverging practices and beliefs). Seo and Creed (2002) note that changes are a result 
of human practice and institutional contradictions (norms institutionalized earlier or in different 
contexts may lead to inefficiency, loss of adaptation, institutional incompatibilities and misalignment 
of agents' interests). The pursuit of better adaptation conditions would imply a political dispute among 
the several constituents. 
The space for strategy formulation and execution is thereby outlined; the environment, in its 
institutional facet, exerts pressures that may constrain choice; agents, however, have room to 
maneuver. They are not always aware of the pressures suffered or the possible alternatives. And, 
whether they like it or not, and willfully or not, they constantly contribute to the institutionalization 
and de-institutionalization of the social structures in which they are embedded.  
 Economic Rents and Legitimacy: Incorporating Elements of Organizational Analysis Institutional Theory  
to the Field of Business Strategy  
 
BAR, v. 4, n. 1, art. 4, p. 51-65, Jan./April 2007    www.anpad.org.br/bar 
57
 
LEGITIMACY AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE  
 
 
Weber (1999) was among the first social theorists to draw attention to the central role legitimacy 
plays in social life, by pointing that forms of action are guided by a belief in the existence of a 
legitimate order, a set of identifiable maxims providing models actors regard as somehow mandatory 
or exemplary to themselves.  
Organizations need legitimacy: “organizations require more than material resources and technical 
information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environments. They also need social 
acceptability and credibility” (Scott, 2001, p.58).  
An organization's legitimacy can be understood as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy affects not only how individuals 
act in relation to organizations, but how they understand them. Therefore, many audiences perceive 
legitimate organizations not only as more valuable, but also as more meaningful, predictable and 
trustworthy. Legitimacy in this context can be regarded as a valuable resource under the more 
traditional criteria of the RBV, even if more careful analysis reveals that legitimacy is in fact a special 
resource that is realized by permitting differentiated access to other resources, acting, in this sense, as 
a meta-resource (a resource that gives access to other resources, Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
A managerial issue that arises in the process of strategy formulation and execution is the possibility 
of managing legitimacy. Suchman (1995) discusses two possibilities, despite highlighting their 
limitations, particularly as regards “unintended consequences and unexpected feedback loops that may 
plague attempts to manipulate legitimacy in a narrowly instrumental way” (p. 573).  
According to the strategic approach, legitimacy is seen as an operating resource organizations draw 
from their cultural environments and employ in the pursuit of their objectives (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990; Oliver, 1991, 1997; Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995). Managers may act to gain, maintain or 
repair three different kinds of legitimacy:  pragmatic (meeting the interests of constituents), moral 
(doing what must be done) and cognitive (this is how it is supposed to be).  
The institutional approach (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), in turn, portrays 
legitimacy as a set of constitutive beliefs (Suchman, 1988); legitimacy and institutionalization are both 
related, they empower organizations mainly by making them appear natural and meaningful: “access 
to resources is largely a by-product” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). Neilsen and Rao (1987) define 
legitimation as a collective meaning creation process, criticizing the view of the agent as being capable 
of manipulating a passive set of actors; they argue that legitimacy must be approached as a complex 
process of social construction of reality.  
“Organizational legitimacy is a valued but problematic resource” argue Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 
191). According to these authors, the phenomenon of the pursuit of legitimacy can be seen as a series 
of combined vicious cycles. Firstly, when an organization seeks legitimacy, the many constituents 
observe it more strictly, which gives less room to deal with deviations from constituents' expectations 
and even less decoupling opportunities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Secondly, inasmuch as legitimacy is 
associated with resources, defending or expanding it becomes more difficult. Culture, infrastructure, 
commitments and time constraints may even further reduce the organization's capacity to respond. 
Thirdly, the more problematic legitimacy becomes, the more skeptical constituents may be toward 
legitimation attempts. Combination of these three dynamics may lead managers into bumbling, 
nervous or excessively zealous legitimation attempts, thereby validating the constituents' skepticism 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).  
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INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY  
 
 
Whether as a resource, a meta-resource or a condition arising from a process, legitimacy matters to 
managers. The ability to manage it may be open to discussion, but not ignored.  
Defending the institutional strategy view, Lawrence (1999) argues: “the concept of institutional 
strategy is important for the widened and wizened strategic lens it provides. An understanding of the 
importance of institutional strategy and the contingencies associated with its accomplishment will aid 
managers in dealing with the competitive context in which they operate. The often taken-for-granted 
rules and standards that situate a firm with respect to other firms, customers, suppliers, and other 
organizations inevitably provide both opportunity and constraint. A conception of these rules and 
standards as socially constructed, and consequently manageable opens up strategic possibilities. At the 
same time, however, the nature of institutional structures inevitably makes change difficult” (p. 185-
186).  
Lawrence, Winn and Devereaux Jennings (2001) argue that the temporal dynamics of 
institutionalization spheres (practices, rules or technologies) is important, can be identified and 
predicted, and that knowledge of this dynamics would enable managers to carry out strategic action. 
The mechanisms used in institutionalization efforts – influence, force, discipline or domination – 
depend on the target's (organizations; individuals) capacity for agency and on how power is wielded – 
whether episodically (demanding continuous application of power to sustain itself) or systemically 
(embedded into routine systems that do not require constant activation), with implications for speed of 
institutionalization and for the stability of those spheres.    
Still from the same voluntaristic viewpoint, but perceiving the institutional context as more of a 
constraint, Oliver (1997) points out “that a firm’s ability to generate rents from resources and 
capabilities will depend primarily on the firm’s effectiveness in managing the social context of these 
resources and capabilities” (p. 711). Normative rationality, institutional insulation mechanisms (low 
level of cultural or political support to resource-related decisions) and isomorphic pressures act as sub-
optimizers in resource selection and acquisition decisions.  
Elsbach and Sutton (1992), on the other hand, explore a situation where institutional strategy, 
through deliberate management of the impressions of the other constituents, creates unprecedented 
possibilities to obtain resources for the social organizations. These organizations achieved great 
exposure after their members carried out illegal activities, but their rules adopted the appearance of 
institutional conformity as a tactic and were successful in decoupling from the illegitimate acts 
performed.  
The institutional strategy, however, can be seen from a less voluntaristic perspective. Peng (2003) 
suggests that “the strategic choices for the three major types of firms (new, entrant and established 
entrepreneurs), which may constitute an organizational field, are identifiable and predictable” (p. 291). 
In a way, therefore, institutional conditions determine choices. Inasmuch as this is observed, it is 
worth asking whether such strategies are not closer to institutionalized strategies, that is, alternatives 
regarded as natural or as the only viable choice, and whether the agent is not, therefore, culturally 
determined (Beckert, 1999; Zucker, 1983). While exploring the implications of the Institutional 
Theory for strategic thinking, Crubellate, Grave and Mendes (2004) discuss this view as a third school, 
in addition to voluntarism and determinism.  
Stone and Brush (1996) discuss the dilemma of planning in ambiguous contexts. Informal and vague 
plans allow gaining the commitment of many constituents with distinct interests; at the same time, 
there is a need to show formalized managerial practices to acquire legitimacy in the face of critical 
resource providers. What does it represent: institutional strategy or institutionalized strategy? 
The adoption of new techniques and the phenomenon of managerial fads are studied by Wood and 
Caldas (2002) and Abrahamson (1996), in both cases from a perspective that avoids excessive Economic Rents and Legitimacy: Incorporating Elements of Organizational Analysis Institutional Theory  
to the Field of Business Strategy  
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voluntarism or determinism. Agents find themselves subject to institutional pressures that at once 
condition and enable their action; consultants articulate discourse that require legitimacy before their 
future buyers (Abrahamson, 1996); these, in turn, adopt techniques with a greater or lesser degree of 
critical analysis (Wood & Caldas, 2002), and are driven by several motivations, whether intentional or 
not. This brings plenty of room for institutional strategies and institutionalized strategies.    
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
 
In light of the relevance of institutional pressures and the need organizations have of legitimacy, an 
important phenomenon to discuss in the context of institutional strategy is entrepreneurship. “The 
question left unanswered, however, is how initial and early adopters are enabled to be different” 
(Sherer & Lee, 2002, p. 104).  
According to Sherer and Lee (2002), the scarcity of resources motivates, and legitimacy enables, 
institutional change; in their study, they find that innovation has occurred with prestigious companies 
that faced scarce resources and had the legitimacy to change the rules and resources. Lounsbury and 
Glynn (2001) argue that the institutional strategy of new entrepreneurs resides in the narratives they 
tell about their capital stock in order to legitimize their businesses; these narratives allow acquiring 
new capital and subsequently generating wealth and accumulation (of new capital). Construction of an 
identity that is perceived as legitimate involves balancing the need to sustain a strategic differentiation, 
on the one hand, and the need to align with the norms and constraints imposed by structural factors at 
the level of the industry in which they operate, on the other.  
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) discuss the constraints entrepreneurs face in emerging industries, 
particularly the lack of cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. They suggest that entrepreneurs 
should strive to strike a balance between the attempt to differentiate from the others and the need for 
cognitive efforts from all the actors in the emerging industry to portray the new activity as familiar and 
trustworthy in order to survive as a group.  
Institutional entrepreneurship therefore involves ambiguity and contradiction; seeks differentiation, 
but needs isomorphism; presents itself as an alternative to institutionalized choice, but success has 
institutionalized it. Stinchcombe (1965) was among the first to acknowledge the strong influence of 
social and institutional conditions on the structure of an organization in the early period after its 
foundation (imprinting), and the trend of such traits persisting, becoming institutionalized.  
 
 
BUSINESS STRATEGY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
 
Having acknowledged the pertinence and relevance of the institutional view to the strategy 
formulation and execution process, we must now analyze the impact of its incorporation into the 
theoretical references of Business Strategy addressed here, namely Industrial Organization, the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) and the Dynamic Capabilities theory. A far too complex task for the 
purposes of this work, but too important to ignore.  
The conceptual framework of Industrial Organization lies based on the Structure-Conduct-
Performance assumption (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). The manager's agency is strongly constrained by 
the industrial structure in which the firm operates, and which offers - among the range of alternatives 
leading to competitive advantage – the choice of a generic (institutionalized) strategy that defends it 
from the forces of the industry. The variables seen under the five-forces model are essentially 
microeconomic in nature and the demarcation of the analytical unit (the industry) shares the same 
roots.  Marco Aurélio Lima de Queiroz, Flávio Carvalho de Vasconcelos, Rafael Guilherme Burstein Goldszmidt 
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The arguments of the Institutional Theory indicate opportunities for strategic action arising from the 
role of legitimacy that has an influence on the firm's economic performance. The possibility of 
changing the rules of the game, which were once considered socially constructed, would result in 
adding variables to each one of the five forces. Barriers to new entrants, for example, might be 
developed from institutional strategies. Based on the acknowledgement of the influence of many 
institutional spheres, the definition of industry structure – a core concept for this school of thought – 
would need to be reviewed. Recursiveness and the agency-structure duality, however, weaken the 
model's central assumption (Structure-Conduct-Performance).  
According to the Resource Based View, incorporation of the Institutional Theory has already 
been discussed as institutional capital, “. . . defined as the firm's capability to support value-
enhancing assets and competencies. Institutional capital is the context surrounding resources and 
resource strategies that enhances or inhibits the optimal use of valued resource capital” (Oliver, 
1997, p. 709).  
In this sense, legitimacy itself tends to be seen as a resource that is non-tradeable, socially complex 
and built over time (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Legitimacy stock grows through the accumulation of 
flows derived from institutional strategies or the adoption of institutionalized strategies. This 
accumulation process, however, as discussed by Dierickx and Cool (1989), is constrained by time 
compression diseconomies (negative implications of a concentrated effort to gain legitimacy in 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), interconnected resources (multiple spheres) and causal ambiguity (limited 
rationality, social embeddedness, unintended consequences of action, multiple spheres).  
Characterizing legitimacy as a resource would fit the attributes that define a resource as capable of 
generating competitive advantage under the RBV (as in Barney, 1986b, in an analysis of 
organizational culture as a resource). Legitimacy can create economic value (Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001; Oliver, 1997) and is difficult to imitate, because of its accumulation process (path-dependence 
conditions, industry or firm evolution stage). It is not necessarily rare, but may become so in specific 
contexts for a certain period of time, particularly if tied in with other exclusive resources the firm may 
have. In addition, legitimacy, in line with the RBV's imperfect factors (resources) market assumption, 
and with the institutionalist view this paper presents, is not a resource whose economic rent generating 
potential can be known in advance.  
Under the Dynamic Capabilities view, legitimacy as a meta-resource, or as a process, shaped by the 
firm's current position in terms or resources and evolutionary path, can more directly articulate with 
the institutional analysis. The focus of this Business Strategy perspective on the process of adaptation 
of environments undergoing rapid technological change with creative destruction dynamics (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), allows accommodating both (strategic) agency and structure. But this 
approach's Schumpeterian environment is essentially technical. Technologies change, but the rules of 
the game do not. Regarding these rules as socially constructed would make room for institutional 
strategies and for the institutional entrepreneur, removing emphasis from adapting and reconfiguring 
to meet environmental pressures that mainly suggests the possibility of firms adopting 
institutionalized strategies.  
 
 
LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMIC RENTS  
 
 
The theoretical view that prevails in the Business Strategy field drives managers to evaluate and 
implement strategies leading to achieving economic rents (monopoly, Ricardian or entrepreneurial), 
and essentially explores the technical environment.  
Incorporating the institutional perspective as presented here suggests that legitimacy, whether as a 
resource, meta-resource, and whether achieved deliberately or not, be acknowledged as an axis of 
reference in the development of strategies by firms, and that sustained above-average returns are Economic Rents and Legitimacy: Incorporating Elements of Organizational Analysis Institutional Theory  
to the Field of Business Strategy  
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essentially dependent on the legitimacy status. We propose, therefore, the following analytical 
framework:  
Position Relative to Peer (Competitors) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achieving superior returns (derived from sources of economic rent) without legitimacy will leave 
the firm vulnerable both to institutional entrepreneurs and to other competitors, particularly those that, 
endowed with greater credibility or a larger stock of institutional capital, may achieve success with 
institutional strategies that bring about a reconfiguration of the resources base in such a manner as to 
become more favorable to them (for example, by means of regulatory changes, influencing public 
opinion, blocking access to resources etc.).      
Legitimacy in and of itself is no assurance of sources of economic rent, but institutional capital can 
be used as a resource to forward institutional or institutionalized strategies giving access to other 
resources that may be sources of economic rent. Unsuccessful efforts may compromise the firm's 
legitimacy, leaving it in a non-sustainable situation that jeopardizes survival itself.  
Lack of legitimacy, together with the lack of sources of economic rent, however, also characterizes 
the standing entrepreneurs or firms in emerging industries sometimes find themselves in, imposing the 
strategic challenge: to innovate and differentiate to obtain sources of economic rent, but, at the same 
time, appear as familiar, trustworthy, similar (isomorphism), in order to acquire the much-needed 
legitimacy.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to explore every possibility and dynamic this analytical perspective 
offers, but only to point out the relevance of the issue of legitimacy to business strategy thinking.         
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
The field of Business Strategy has much to gain from incorporating elements developed based on the 
Institutional Theory, although this view challenges the several core assumptions of prevalent schools 
of thought. It is perhaps because of this challenge that adopting a new view is so important.  
The conception of an institutional facet of the environment, with many spheres of influence; the 
notion of duality in the agency-structure relationship, mediated by interpretation; the recursive nature 
of the institutionalization process; legitimacy as a resource, a meta-resource  and the result of a 
process; all of these constitute a relatively new and rather complex repertoire for study, demanding 
new Business Strategy analysis methods and techniques. The destination is unclear, but the journey is 
certainly attractive.  
Legitimacy 
Return / economic rent 
achievement 
Sustainable 
Return 
Return at 
Risk 
Potential for Rent 
Creation 
Non-
Sustainable 
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